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        ABSTRACT 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his 
pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the 
essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends 
on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as 
confused as nearly all the other commentary on W and on human behavior throughout the behavioral 
sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair 
psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time.  He laid out the 
general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly 
equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus 
be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to realize it. W 
was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank 
slate or cultural view of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been 
interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the opposite of his overall 
thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). 
 
I provide my recent (2016) table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two systems 
point of view before remarking on each of the essays. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems 
view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my 
e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and 
Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my 
e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 
2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As always in philosophical writing, it is quite striking that nobody (in my view) fully grasps what W was 
doing and no one to this day has succeeded (and few even try) to follow his Socratic method with constant 
recourse to perspicuous examples of our psychological functioning. 
 
His wholly novel ideas and unique style and telegraphic writing, coupled with his often solitary, almost 
solipsistic lifestyle, and premature death in 1951, resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later 
thought during his lifetime and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 pages been published- a 
project which continues to this day. The only complete edition of the largely German nachlass was first 
issued by Oxford in 2000 with Intelex now publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English language 
books on a searchable CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford CD is over $1000 or over $2000 
for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. They can however be obtained via interlibrary 
loan and also, like most books even free. One reason I mention this is that, though most of his best work 
has now been translated and published in English, it is useful and often indispensable to consider his 
German remarks in the nachlass and few scholars are up to it. Editing and translating of his work by his 
executors has also been less than perfect and capturing the precise meaning of the original German is a 
huge problem as several authors here note (e.g., the need in many passages to translate “darstellung” as 
an action and not as a disposition (propositional attitude)—one of many distinctions W was the first to 
elucidate.  One can get a graphic view of this by looking at Victor Rodych’s two revelatory articles (the 
first without and the latter with the benefit of the nachlass) on W and Godel in the journal Minds and 
Machines. See my comments in the 2016 article on W and Searle.  
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of 
Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which 
I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current 
researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table 
as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I 
have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with 
hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 and 
S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, 
all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many 
complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about 
behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain 
contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of 
Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the 
Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental State No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers 
or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or 
COS1 by myself). 
 
*       Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**       Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****    Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- 
referential. 
*******  Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have 
exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy)  only get us further away from 
the truth.  It is critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each 
use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be 
compared with this one.  
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
It is well known that W dramatically altered his views beginning in 1929 and by the mid 30’s essentially 
totally rejected his prior work, including the famous Tractatus. However, the Tractatus continues to 
fascinate and several of the current authors (Diamond, Conant) follow a long tradition in trying to explain 
just what he meant and how this changed or did not in his later work.  For me, the only value in this is to 
see how early in his life (ca 1914) he began to express the germs of his later understanding of human 
psychology.  On this issue I think Hacker’s final essay here is definitive. His affirmative answer to “Was he 
trying to whistle it?” indicates that W of the Tractatus was trying to describe what he so famously insisted 
could not be said but only shown. Hacker (along with everyone else on the planet) does not seem to 
realize that this meant that W was trying to describe the functioning of the axioms of our innate 
evolutionary psychology by giving examples from our everyday use of language (i.e., from our thought), 
but he does a beautiful job of refuting Diamond and Conant ’s views in their essays here, and many others 
elsewhere, and provides chapter and verse for this view.  See e.g., various comments on pg 360,363, 372, 
373, 376-81 for W’s clear references to our innate and unquestionable (i.e. denying our axioms lacks sense) 
intentionality. Hacker puts an end (one hopes) to the view that W was actually writing Kierkegaardian 
nonsense. 
 
Crary’s introductory essay is tolerable, but makes a grotesque understatement on p3 when she states that 
there is “something essentially unsatisfactory” about the view that W supported the idea that there is “no 
such thing as fully objective agreement.”  In fact such a view is utterly mistaken, as is amply 
demonstrable throughout his latter writings in which he shows that our normal behavior is the very 
definition of objective agreement and it’s denial is incoherent (see e.g., his last work “On Certainty”).  
 
Cavell was one of the first to begin to penetrate deeply into W and his typically brilliant essay (reprinted 
from 1979) almost gets to the core of the matter, but he tends to get rather more florid and poetic than I 
think useful, and just does not quite get that W was laying out the structure of our evolved EP.  Of course 
he can be forgiven as nobody else does either.  
 
McDowell’s essay from 1981 is quite dated and severely hampered by his rather opaque style, but has 
some good points, in spite of the expected oblivion to W’s defining the modern study of innate intentional 
psychology.  
 
I find Finkelstein’s article on W and Platonism to be excellent and agree that Kripke and Wright are wrong 
and McDowell and Tait are right about this. Though neither he nor anyone I have read sees it this way, it 
seems to me very useful to view Plato’s Ideals as our cognitive modules programmed by our genes.  No 
term will be perfect, but if we have to label W’s views, then I agree with Finkelstein and McDowell that 
“naturalistic Platonist” get pretty close. Certainly he dealt the death blow to the idea that an 
interpretation is required to follow a rule.  
 
Read’s comments on word meanings seems unexceptionable but the writing is horrific (ie, more or less 
standard philosophy).  
 
Stone on W on Deconstruction has its moments but for me Decon and Derrida are an utter waste of time 
and it is comical how he tends to lapse into the typical Decon word salad (I first typed “world salad”, which 
seems apt as well) when he discusses Derrida.  Again we find Kripke’s bizarre skeptical interpretation of 
W discussed and rejected. In spite of occasional lapses, it is clear as crystal that W rejected the blank slate 
community consensus view in favor of his novel innate axiomatic description of our psychology. Meaning 
is normative because it’s innate, automatic and invisible and not subject to interpretation—a word W 
reserves for “the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.”(p100). Neither Kripke nor Derrida 
gets the point since (like nearly everyone) they are hopelessly ensnared in the blank slate defaults when 
trying to explain behavior.   
 
Crary’s essay on W and political thought is clever but standard blank slate again and so hopeless. Politics, 
like all of culture, is a slight extension of our evolutionary psychology which demonstrates the ineluctable 
dominance of nature over nurture and W’s contribution was to point this out, though usually indirectly. 
 
Putnam’s “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity” shows that by 1994 he had begun to understand W, but 
even so it’s a big advance over his earlier work. 
 
Floyd on W and mathematical philosophy is pretty good stuff, but does not grasp the overall picture of W 
as an evolutionary psychologist and math as a slight extension of our intuitive psychology. There is no 
boundary between math and the rest of our intentionality and W interleaved math examples throughout 
his work.  Many of his most incisive revelations on our psychological functions and the relation of 
language to the world he demonstrated with mathematics or geometry.  Floyd gives a good discussion of 
W’s example of trisecting the angle which requires that we carefully examine the operation of disposition 
words like think, doubt, imagine, believe, know, decide and realize they depict actions or potential for 
actions and not mental states, as W first pointed out in the 1930’s. But in this case, as in all cases (ie, all of 
language and philosophy) this is only the beginning of what W shows us and we need to realize that 
“question”, “answer”, “mathematics”, “proof”, “equation”, etc., the various uses of which comprise 
complex language games (concepts or cognitive modules or groups of them) which often have little or 
NOTHING in common except that they are all included in our psychology (our form of life as he liked to say,) 
but this all operates invisibly and automatically in our subterranean psychology and thus is overlooked by 
virtually everyone including, incredibly, nearly all philosophers (even specialists on W), as this book also 
sadly illustrates.  To Floyd’s great credit, she gets it mostly right and the book is worth buying just for her 
article! Those intrigued by mathematical avenues into intentional psychology, as well as a general view of 
W might find a few things of interest in my comments on W and Godel and math in my 2016 article.  
 
Diamond wastes her article on W by spending most of it discussing such items of philosophical esoterica 
as what the Tractatus implied regarding Russell’s work, which is probably one of the least interesting ways 
to investigate human behavior. 
 
Cerbone likewise expends his energies mostly on the historical aspects of W’s relation to Frege, though he 
does make some good points about the limits of sense along the way (e.g., that the language games W 
proposed often would require a substantial remodeling of our psyche to work).  Sadly and almost 
inevitably (i.e., oblivion to how our mind works is another of the hundreds of universals of our EP) he 
seems to evince no real grasp that it was his insights into our evolutionary psychology that gave such 
power to W’s work, that these innate axioms (or concepts or cognitive modules) provide our “conceptual 
skin”(p308), is not clear that T and F do not apply to logic and math in the same sense as to empirical facts 
and that they are extensions of limited parts of our psychology, and that if we have a reasonable test for 
“illogical” then this term definitely characterizes much of our behavior.  But a reasonably stimulating read 
nonetheless. 
 
Witherspoon’s article on W and Carnap ( member of the Vienna circle and the only person W ever accused 
of plagiarism) leaves me cold, as he has no insight at all into the workings of the mind, although he uses 
(abuses) lots of the right words—“logical syntax”, “linguistic framework,” “grammar.”  Yes, he is certainly 
right that we often misunderstand W, but the really important point is that we ought to understand 
behavior. He justly gives attention to W’s last work “On Certainty” which some regard as his best (though 
he was dying of prostate cancer at the time and was often barely able to work) and seems on the way to 
becoming (with TLP and PI) his most famous (e.g., see the two recent books by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock).  
But, he wastes his time on vague theorizing about “quasi-understanding” rather than explicating the 
depths of our intentional psychology, so beautifully laid out by W. 
 
Those who wish to have a more conventional (but in my view typically confused-- in spite of some good 
points) review of this volume may consult Philosophical Investigations 24:2p185-92(2001).   
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for the analysis of language and behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
